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CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: WHAT KEEPING IT IN THE
FAMILY MEANS FOR EVERYONE ELSE†
TONITA MURRAY*
The United Nations estimates that 30 per cent of all international development funding is lost
to corruption. Identifying and understanding the dynamics of how such corruption occurs at
the ground level could help to reduce opportunities for the diversion of funds from public
purposes to private uses. An analysis of two highly publicized corruption cases in Kenya and
one in Afghanistan identifies some common characteristics that may also be present in other
cases around the world. The characteristics fall into four categories: (1) political, social,
and cultural; (2) governance; (3) people; and (4) international. Different understandings of
corruption, weak government and laws, illegitimate involvement of powerful politicians
or their relatives, and ineffective international mechanisms for preventing corruption all
contribute to the loss of development funding. The article describes these characteristics
and discusses remedies for addressing them.
Les Nations Unies estiment que trente pour cent de toutes les subventions mondiales au
développement se perdent en raison de la corruption. Mieux comprendre la dynamique qui
permet à de telles pratiques de prendre racine réduirait les occasions de détourner des
fonds publics vers le secteur privé. Une analyse de deux cas très médiatisés de corruption au
Kenya et d’un autre en Afghanistan permet de relever des caractéristiques communes qui se
retrouvent sans doute dans d’autres cas à travers le monde. Ces caractéristiques se divisent
en quatre catégories : 1) des raisons politiques, sociales et culturelles, 2) la gouvernance,

†

*

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Second OHLJ Symposium,
Understanding and Taming Public and Private Corruption in the 21st Century,
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3) les personnes mises en causes et 4) la conjoncture mondiale. Des notions divergentes
de ce qu’est la corruption, la faiblesse des gouvernements et de la législation, des gestes
illégaux posés par de puissants politiciens et des membres de leur famille et l’inefficacité
des mécanismes internationaux de prévention de la corruption expliquent ensemble la perte
de ces fonds destinés au développement. Cet article décrit ces caractéristiques et discute
des moyens de les résoudre.
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CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES is not well understood by international

donors or by their recipients. While both donors and recipients might accept
at face value the imperfect but useful World Bank definition of corruption as
“the abuse of public powers for private benefit,”1 their understandings of the
definition are, in fact, intrinsically different. Without a common understanding,
solutions to what both parties see as a serious problem for development are likely
to be elusive and ineffective.
With official development assistance (“ODA”)2 surpassing 134 billion
US dollars (“USD”) in 2013, bilateral international donors and multilateral

1.
2.

The World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank
(Washington: World Bank Group, September 1997) at 8, online: <www1.worldbank.org/
publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf> [World Bank, Combat Corruption].
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defines ODA as flows of
funding provided by official agencies to developing countries and territories designated as
recipients and to multilateral institutions (for example, the United Nations) for the purposes
of economic development and welfare. At least 25 per cent of the funding is in the form of a
grant. Military spending and the enforcement element of peacekeeping are not included in
the ODA amount.
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organizations3 make funding contingent on the recipient country agreeing to
certain governance standards to ensure transparency and accountability. To
help the recipient governments meet the requirements, donors often provide
technical assistance and capacity building intended to strengthen recipients’
ability to manage resources, provide services, govern well, and avoid corrupt
practices. While such requirements appear reasonable and no less than what an
astute lender would expect of a responsible borrower, they are standards based on
the principles and practices of advanced countries. As the cases discussed below
illustrate, capacity development to improve management is frequently inadequate.
Although donors understand that they are assisting countries that have low
levels of development, they nevertheless frequently set terms that are difficult
for inexperienced, unstable, or barely functioning governments to achieve. They
make few allowances for the culture, politics, or powerful non-governmental
pressures that influence how some societies act or for the difficulties that weak
governments experience in fulfilling the terms of their funding agreements. In
other words, the terms often tend to ignore prevailing political and social norms
of the recipient country, rudimentary public administration systems, and the slow
pace at which political, financial, and legal sophistication is acquired. The result
is that developing countries often do not achieve the standards of governance,
accountability, and transparency set out; fall short of development goals; and
frequently engage in practices considered corrupt by donor standards but not
necessarily by recipient countries.
Attaching anti-corruption measures to aid funding is a relatively recent donor
requirement. During the Cold War era (1945–1991), both Soviet and Western
Bloc countries used aid as a means of winning allies in the developing world,
tolerating the most blatant corruption of recipient governments. The corrupt and
repressive dictator Mobuto Sese Seko of Zaire is a notorious example. He amassed
a huge fortune during his thirty-two years in power but maintained the support
of Western states because of his support for their interests and his willingness to
provide them with access to mineral and oil resources.4 Since the 1990s, however,
there has been growing global intolerance to corruption. Observers attribute this
to the proliferation of governments adopting democratic principles; the growth
3.
4.

Multilateral organizations or institutions are funded by donor governments and are
intermediaries in the delivery of development aid. They include such organizations as the
United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank.
Howard W French, “Anatomy of an Autocracy: Mobutu’s 32-Year Reign,” The
New York Times (17 May 1997), online: <partners.nytimes.com/library/world/
africa/051797zaire-mobutu.html>.
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of a free news media; the expansion of globalization; and the opening of markets
that bring countries into closer contact with one another, thereby creating a
requirement for assured common business standards.5
As for the recipient countries, their understanding of corruption is influenced
by their different experiences and culture. A significant number of recipient
countries still retain many of the characteristics of traditional, collective societies.
They may have factionalized owing to tribal rivalries, experienced conflict, or
endured a long history of scarcity and struggle for survival. Such societies tend to
focus on the present rather than the future and on what is close to them—such as
the protection of their extended families and tribal groups. Reciprocal gift giving
may also be part of the process of customary governance. Authority in such social
organization is exercised by a few individuals: the heads of families, tribal elders,
and warrior leaders. Apart from perhaps the intelligentsia, such societies normally
do not have a strong adherence to or great expectations of national government.
Consequently, many may have difficulty consciously appreciating such abstract
notions as the rule of law or accountability or the idea that governments are
expected to act for the greater good and provide services impartially.
In traditional societies, confidence that one’s interests are protected derives
from personal relationships based on kinship, alliances, and patronage rather than
impersonal systems of government. This means there is little appreciation of the
concept of the abuse of public powers for private benefit. All power is regarded
as personal, family, or tribal. While those with power are expected to look after
those without it, the allocation of resources between oneself and others is largely
left to the power holder to decide. This cultural view is well illustrated in Wrong’s
account of how tribes in Kenya regard their clan members’ election to political
office or appointment to public office as their “turn to eat”—in other words, their
turn to receive largesse from office holders.6 Added to this is the fact that scarcity
encourages opportunism. When there is something to “eat,” there is a tendency
for those who have the opportunity to seize as much of it as they can while it
is there.7 Large international donations frequently provide the opportunity for
those who have access to the funds to divert them from the intended purpose to

5.
6.
7.

George T Abed & Sanjeev Gupta, “The Economics of Corruption: An Overview” in
George T Abed & Sanjeev Gupta, eds, Governance, Corruption, & Economic Performance
(Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2002) 1 at 2.
Michela Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower (London: Fourth
Estate, 2009) [ Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat].
Ibid. See also Charles Hornsby, Kenya: A History Since Independence (New York: Tauris, 2012)
ch 14 at 787ff.
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the support of a fortunate few.8 While this might be criticized in the media and
by the opposition, it often can be done with impunity because others will do the
same when it is their turn to “eat.” And if the origin of the funding is international,
there is frequently resentment that it has been provided to achieve donor aims
rather than to satisfy the wishes of the recipient nations. Consequently, there may
be some degree of tolerance towards the diversion of funds.

I. RESEARCH ON CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Economists were among the first researchers of corruption. They approached
it both theoretically and empirically. Some economists regard corruption as a
product of modernization in underdeveloped countries, while others argue that
it encourages efficiency in developing societies.9 Bribes allow business obstacles
such as time delay or rigid laws to be surmounted; the most efficient companies
are the most able to afford the ‘commissions’ that win contracts and licences. The
efficiency of corruption is refuted empirically by other economists who show that
perceived corruption reduces economic growth10 and pushes up efficiency costs
by introducing various distortions such as secrecy into government activities.
They argue that eliminating the distortions introduced by corrupt activity in fact
increases efficiency.11 This dispute, however, may be due to different conceptions
of corruption. Those researchers who consider corruption efficient might be
thinking of what is referred to as “petty” or “bureaucratic” corruption, while
those who consider it inefficient have “grand” corruption in mind. The two types
of corruption are discussed below.

8.

Toyin Falola & Jessica Achberger, eds, The Political Economy of Development and
Underdevelopment in Africa (New York: Routledge, 2013); Brady Yauch, “A never-ending
story: More Canadian foreign aid money lost to corruption, this time in Kenya,”
Probe International (23 December 2010), online: <journal.probeinternational.
org/2010/12/23/a-never-ending-story-more-canadian-foreign-aid-money-lost-to-corruptionthis-time-in-kenya>.
9. Nathaniel H Leff, “Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption” (1964) 8:3
Am Behav Sci 8; Samuel P Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven,
Conn: Yale University Press, 1968) at 59-71; Francis T Lui, “An Equilibrium Model of
Bribery” (1985) 93:4 J Pol Econ 760; Douglas A Houston, “Can Corruption Ever Improve
An Economy?” (2007) 27:3 Cato J 325.
10. Paulo Mauro, “Corruption and Growth” (1995) 110:3 QJ Econ 681 at 704.
11. Benjamin A Olken & Rohini Pande, “Corruption in Developing Countries” (2012) 4:1 Ann
Rev Econ 479 at 484.
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Other researchers have examined the causes of corruption. Some postulate
that it is more prevalent in developing than economically advanced countries
because of ethnic factionalization, federal systems of government, the presence
of mineral and metal resources, and cultures of giving “honour gifts.”12 Others
theorize that countries with a Protestant tradition, democratic and unitary
governments, a history of British influence, a common-law legal system, more
economic development, and greater openness to trade tend to be less corrupt.13
There is some empirical support for the Protestantism hypothesis,14 but evidence
for the other factors inhibiting corruption is mixed.15 Kenya, a former British
colony, exhibits most of the identified characteristics, but as the case studies below
demonstrate, it has high levels of corruption and is thus a notable exception to
the theory. The tentativeness of empirical findings on corruption research may
be owing to a number of factors such as differing definitions of corruption, the
fact that much corruption is hidden, and the lack of substantive as opposed
to perception data. While there is an increasing amount of research based on

12. Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, “Rents, Competition, and Corruption” (1999) 89:4 Am
Econ Rev 982; P Steidlmeier, “Gift Giving, Bribery and Corruption: Ethical Management
of Business Relationships in China” (1999) 20:2 J Bus Ethics 121. Steidlmeier discusses
the cultural and moral differences between gift giving on the one hand and bribery and
corruption on the other hand in China. This distinction is important since we all appreciate
how gift giving engenders a sense of obligation and can result in ambiguity over its motive. A
young Kenyan police officer told the author that, in his view, corruption in Kenya is founded
on the tradition of gift giving. For example, gifts are taken to tribal elders by those seeking to
obtain advice. These are “honour gifts” that show respect to an elder. But they also constitute
what we understand by the phrase, “the norm of reciprocity,” the concept of returning a
favour. In Canada, we give gifts to our hosts who invite us to dinner. That is both an honour
gift to thank them for their kindness and also a way of giving something in return for dinner.
In some cultures, particularly those where personal relationships are favoured over impersonal
systems of conduct, there is likely to be less distinction between a gift, a tip, or a bribe.
13. Neil J Smelser & Seymour Martin Lipset, “Social Structure, Mobility and Development”
in Neil J Smelser & Seymour Martin Lipset, eds, Social Structure & Mobility in Economic
Development (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 966) ch 1 at 1ff; Rafael LaPorta, Florencio
Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership Around the World” (1999)
55:2 J Fin 471.
14. Daniel Treisman, “The causes of corruption: a cross-national study” (2000) 76:3
J Pub Econ 399.
15. Ibid. See also Lorenzo Pellegrini & Reyer Gerlagh, “Causes of Corruption: A Survey of
Cross-Country Analyses and Extended Results” (2008) 9:2 Econ Gov 245 at 258.
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observed and measured characteristics of corruption, many studies still are based
on general conclusions.16
Game theory provides another approach to studying corruption. Charap
and Harm focus on the interactions between “rulers” and “members” within
political systems that allow rulers to acquire power and economic advantage at an
efficient cost and maintain internal equilibrium through “predatory hierarchies”
of supporters.17 The authors hypothesize an evolution of rent-seeking behaviour.
This evolution begins with anarchy, in which the ruler gains and maintains
advantage through prowess in combat; it moves through a phase of warlords and
gang organization, in which equilibrium is maintained through the dispensation
of favours and monopolies; and it results in advanced bureaucratic systems,
in which the ruler gains and maintains equilibrium through patronage. The
conclusion is that the elimination of patronage and corruption can destabilize a
bureaucracy or political system and lead to the failure of reform—unless there are
compensatory stabilizing mechanisms introduced, such as a ruler’s benevolence.
While the theory provides an explanation for the existence of patronage and
corruption in developing and advanced countries (and in various organizations),
its focus on the systematic and endogenous nature of corruption assumes that
the behaviour of bureaucracies and political systems is more cohesive and
consistent than it is really. It also ignores external influences on a system as well
as the possibility of corrupt groups working independently from each other in
the same system.
Comparisons of corruption in different countries are provided by a number
of international surveys that draw on data collected regularly by the World
Bank, international non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”), and business
risk consultancies. These surveys are useful for identifying where corruption is
most prevalent and for testing theories of corruption. The best known of these
16. See e.g. Treisman, supra note 14; Pellegrini & Gerlagh, supra note 15; Jakob Svensson, “Eight
Questions About Corruption” (2005) 19:3 J Econ Persp 19; Johann Graf Lambsdorff,
“Measuring Corruption – The Validity and Precision of Subjective Indicators (CPI)” in
Charles Sampford et al, eds, Measuring Corruption (Burlington, Vt: Ashgate, 2006) ch 5 at
81ff; Fredrik Galtung, “Measuring the Immeasurable: Boundaries and Functions of (Macro)
Corruption Indices” in Sampford et al, supra note 16, ch 6 at 101ff; Nick Duncan, “The
Non-Perception Based Measurement of Corruption: A Review of Issues and Methods from
a Policy Perspective” in Sampford et al, supra note 16, ch 7 at 131ff; William L Miller,
“Perceptions, Experience and Lies: What Measures Corruption and What do Corruption
Measures Measure?” in Sampford et al, supra note 16, ch 8 at 163ff.
17. Joshua Charap & Christian Harm, “Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State”
in Abed & Gupta, supra note 5, 135 at 137.
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is the annual Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, which is
based on a composite of twelve data sources. Other indices containing findings
on corruption include the Business International Survey,18 the World Bank
Enterprise Survey,19 the International Country Risk Guide,20 and the Global
Competitiveness Report21 produced by the World Economic Forum. While
these indices tend to support each other’s findings in a general way, they are
nevertheless based on either proxies or perception data from different sources,
such as businesses and entrepreneurs, rather than actual incidents of corruption.
These are the data frequently used by researchers, which may therefore explain
some of the tentativeness of findings on corruption.
Some research by independent organizations has focused on assessing illicit
financial outflows from developing countries. According to Dev Kar and Brian
LeBlanc, illicit outflows are
a major source of domestic resource leakage, which drains foreign exchange, reduces
tax collections, restricts foreign investments, and worsens poverty in the poorest
developing countries. Illicit flows are all unrecorded private financial outflows
involving capital that is illegally earned, transferred, or utilized, generally used by
residents to accumulate foreign assets in contravention of applicable capital controls
and regulatory frameworks.22

In its 2013 report, Global Financial Integrity presented its financial analysis
for the decade from 2002 to 2011. It found that illicit outflows had increased
in real terms by about 10.2 per cent per annum over the decade and in 2011

18. John Bray, International Business Attitudes to Corruption: Survey 2014/2015 (London: Control
Risks Group Limited, 2014), online: <www.controlrisks.com/~/media/Public%20Site/Files/
Reports/corruptionsurvey2015.pdf>.
19. World Bank Group, “Enterprise Surveys,” online: <www.enterprisesurveys.org>.
20. The PRS Group, “International Country Risk Guide (ICRG),” online: <epub.prsgroup.com/
products/international-country-risk-guide-icrg>.
21. Klaus Schwab, ed, The Global Competitiveness Report: 2014–2015 (Geneva:
World Economic Forum, 2014), online: <www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_
GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf>.
22. Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2011 (Washington: Global Financial
Integrity, December 2013) at 1, online: <iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2013/Illicit_Financial_Flows_
from_Developing_Countries_2002-2011-HighRes.pdf>.
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amounted to 946.7 billion USD.23 Illicit outflows from sub-Saharan Africa were
the highest, at 5.7 per cent of gross domestic product (“GDP”).24
In addition to independent organizations, governments of some countries
also produce data on corruption. For example, the US Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction presents a quarterly report to Congress on
its audits of US government spending on Afghanistan, including reports of
identified corruption, misuse of funds, and failed anti-corruption strategies.25
The audits have shown persistent loss and diversion of substantial amounts of
both military and development aid funds, but in many cases, the audits are
unable to show conclusively whether the losses can be attributed to corruption
or to mismanagement.
Multilateral institutions also conduct extensive research and regularly
publish findings and information on corruption in developing countries.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)
makes a significant contribution to the literature on research and practice.
For example, in December 2014, it released its Foreign Bribery Report,26 which
analyzes four hundred cases from the forty-one signatory countries to the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention27 (“OECD Convention”) that were involved in bribing
foreign public officials. The cases occurred between February 1999, when the
OECD Convention came into force, and June 2014. The value of the bribes was
23. Ibid at 8.
24. Jacey Fortin, “Trillion Dollar Theft: In Developing Countries, Staggering Losses Due To
Corruption Exceed Incoming Aid, Says Report,” International Business Times (27 December
2013), online: <www.ibtimes.com/trillion-dollar-theft-developing-countries-staggeringlosses-due-corruption-exceed-incoming-aid-says>.
25. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United
States Congress (Arlington, Va: SIGAR, 30 April 2012), online: <www.sigar.mil/pdf/
quarterlyreports/2012-04-30qr.pdf> [SIGAR, Quarterly Report 1]; Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (Arlington,
Va: SIGAR, 30 October 2013), online: <www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2013-10-30qr.
pdf>; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the
United States Congress (Arlington, Va: SIGAR, 30 April 2014), online: <www.sigar.mil/pdf/
quarterlyreports/2014-04-30qr.pdf> [SIGAR, Quarterly Report 3]; Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (Arlington, Va:
SIGAR, 30 October 2014), online: <www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-10-30qr.pdf>.
26. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Foreign Bribery Report: An
Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (Paris: OECD, 2014) [OECD,
Foreign Bribery Report].
27. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, 17 December 1997, 37 ILM 1 (entered into force 15 February 1999)
[OECD Convention].
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equivalent to almost 11 per cent of the transaction costs and 34.5 per cent of the
profits.28 Surprisingly, the analysis revealed that bribes are generally paid to win
contracts from state-owned or -controlled companies in advanced rather than
developing economies and that most of those who took and paid bribes are from
wealthy countries.29
Other multilateral institutions conducting corruption research are the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), the World Bank, and the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”).30 With some notable exceptions, the
research tends to focus on specific corruption problems and is largely intended
for practical application.31 Its value lies in its concentration on corruption
in developing countries, which has led to a considerable body of literature
ranging from research findings to anti-corruption training manuals and public
awareness pamphlets.32 Investigative journalists and whistle-blowers also produce
information on corruption in developing countries;33 however, the copious
28. OECD, Foreign Bribery Report, supra note 26 at 8.
29. The UNODC Anti-Corruption Tool Kit is typical of research that results in practical
applications. See United Nations Global Programme against Corruption, Anti-Corruption
Tool Kit, vol 1 (Vienna: UNODC, November 2002), online: <www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/
toolkit/f1tof7.pdf> [UNODC, Anti-Corruption Tool Kit].
30. For example, the IMF commissions and publishes articles from recognized academics as an
educational aid.
31. See e.g. Abed & Gupta, supra note 5; Paolo Mauro, Why Worry About Corruption?
(Washington: International Monetary Fund, February 1997), online: <www.imf.org/
EXTERNAL/PUBS/FT/ISSUES6/issue6.pdf>.
32. See e.g. Abed & Gupta, supra note 5; World Bank, Combat Corruption, supra note 1;
UNODC, Anti-Corruption Tool Kit, supra note 29.
33. Lars Møller & Jack Jackson, Journalistic Legwork that Tumbled a President: A Case Study
and Guide for Investigative Journalists (Washington: World Bank Institute, 2000), online:
<siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/pcij_estrada.pdf>. For
an exposé by investigative journalists of the connection between the Mexican drug cartels
and members of successive Mexican governments including the police and prosecutor, see
Anabel Hernàndez, Narcoland: The Mexican Drug Lords and Their Godfathers, translated by
Iain Bruce & Lorna Scott Fox (New York: Verso, 2013). That investigative journalists can
die as a result of publishing research and investigative findings on government corruption
is illustrated in an article published by the World Bank Institute. See World Bank Institute,
Investigating Corruption in Ukraine: A Case Study of Internet Journalist Georgy Gongadze
(Washington: World Bank Institute, 2002), online: <siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/gongadze1.pdf>. There is also a web-based International
Consortium of Investigative Journalists, which publishes information of government
misdoings around the world. See The Centre for Public Integrity, “International Consortium
of Investigative Journalists” (2015), online: <icij.org>. Nearer to home, investigative
journalists Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein of The Washington Post undertook considerable
research and investigation to uncover the 1970’s Watergate scandal. In the absence of
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information found in television, radio, newspaper, and internet accounts usually
focuses on particular cases. While such accounts contribute to an understanding
of the magnitude and mechanics of corrupt activities, they tend to be descriptive
rather than analytical and contribute only indirectly to understanding the nature
of corruption.
Much of the literature does not distinguish between different categories
of corruption. Some of it, however, distinguishes between “grand” and “petty”
or “bureaucratic” corruption.34 The World Bank makes this distinction in its
corruption taxonomy.35 Grand corruption is often linked with political corruption
because it occurs at the policy level of government where laws can be created,
changed, or subverted for the benefit of powerful actors36 and leaders are able to
abuse their positions with impunity for personal benefit. Petty corruption occurs
at the level of functionaries who use their positions and administrative authority
to exact “facilitating payments” for the provision of a public service.37 While

34.

35.
36.

37.

independent oversight in developing countries, the United Nations Development Programme
provides support to investigative journalism. For example, it supports the Philippine
Center for Investigative Journalism. It also provides training in investigative journalism to
develop the research and investigative capacity of local journalists to help in investigation
of irregularities in public finances and other government corruption. See UNDP & Media
Institute of Southern Africa, The MISA/UNDP Training on Investigating and Reporting
Corruption for Journalists in Southern Africa: Workshop Report (Johannesburg: UNDP, 10
December 2009), online: <www.ifex.org/africa/2009/12/21/report_undp-misa_training_on_
investigative_journalism_dec2009.pdf>; United Nations Development Programme, “Trainer
on Social Media and Writing for the Web” (2014), online: <procurement-notices.undp.
org/view_notice.cfm?notice_id=17324>; Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism,
“Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism” (2015) online: <www.pcij.org>.
See e.g. Robin Palmer, “Combating Grand Corruption in Africa: Should it be an
international crime?” (6 March 2012), online: Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
<www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/combating_grand_coruption_in_africa_-_robin_palmer.
pdf>; Behzad Mashali, “Analyzing the Relationship between Perceived Grand Corruption
and Petty Corruption in Developing Countries: Case Study of Iran” (2012) 78:4 Intl Rev
Admin Sci 775; Gabrielle Poeschl & Raquel Ribeiro, “Everyday Opinions on Grand and
Petty Corruption: A Portuguese Study” (2012) 013 Observatório de Economia y Gestão de
Fraude Working Paper; Stephen P Riley, “Petty Corruption and Development”(1999) 9:1/2
Dev in Prac 189.
World Bank, Combat Corruption, supra note 1 at 8-9.
Palmer, supra note 34; Fintan O’Toole, “State of corruption: power and impunity,”
Book Review of Political Corruption in Ireland 1922–2010: A Crooked Harp? by Elaine
A Byrne, The Irish Times (2 June 2012), online: <www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/
state-of-corruption-power-and-impunity-1.1063548>.
Antonio Argandoña, “Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating Payments” (2005)
60:3 J Bus Ethics 251 at 256.
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grand and petty corruption are mutually reinforcing,38 petty corruption is more
pervasive in developing than advanced countries. For example, all eight countries
listed by the TI Global Corruption Barometer for 2009 as the most affected by
petty bribery are developing nations.39 Failure to distinguish the two categories
of corruption in research appears to be reflected in practice. Yet given the
differences between them—in terms of prevalence, the status of the players, and
the tactics used—it would seem necessary to take different approaches to remedy
each. Similarly, nepotism, cronyism, and patronage receive slight attention in
the research literature, except as aspects of dysfunctional business practices. The
influence of personal relationships in public life, however, is a prominent feature
of developing countries.40
While the literature reveals that there has been active and imaginative study
of corruption in developing countries over the last two decades—with research
results continuing to accumulate—it is nevertheless apparent that the subject
still eludes total comprehension. Such factors as distance, armed conflict, culture,
language, secrecy, the governmental practices of recipient countries, and the
absence of recorded data present barriers to gaining insight into corruption in
developing countries—even for researchers who are on the ground or embedded
in international institutions. The research, consequently, tends to lack detail.

II. CASE STUDIES
The three case studies that follow were chosen for examination because they
identify many of the characteristics of grand corruption in Kenya and Afghanistan.
Furthermore, the author has acted as a policing advisor in both countries and
is thus familiar with the political, social, and law enforcement environments
in which the cases occurred. The cases have been extensively investigated and
publicized within the two countries, so there is available information to examine
38. Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Democracy and ‘grand’ corruption” (1996) 48:149 Intl Soc Sci
J 365; Behzad Mashali, “Analyzing the relationship between perceived grand corruption
and petty corruption in developing countries: case study of Iran” (2012) 78:4 Intl
Rev Admin Sci 775.
39. Transparency International, 2009 Global Corruption Barometer (Berlin: Transparency
International, 30 November 2009) at 3, 7-9, online: <issuu.com/transparencyinternational/
docs/global_corruption_barometer_2009_web?e=2496456/2192681>.
40. Simon Ulrik Kragh, “Nepotism: Organizational Behaviour in Modernizing Societies” (Paper
delivered at the International Association of Cross-Cultural Competence and Management,
Vienna University of Economics and Business, 25 June 2009), online: <www.wu.ac.at/
fileadmin/wu/o/iaccm/Abstracts/2009_25kragh.pdf> at 1-2.
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and identify the characteristics, dynamics, and scale of the corruption they
represent. Comparison with the literature on corruption (discussed in Part I,
above) suggests that the three cases are typical of corruption in most developing
countries. More detailed dissection of their characteristics and dynamics could
therefore yield information on the behaviours of those implicated. The tentative
typology of corrupt behaviour that emerges from the three cases could be tested
against other well-documented cases in other countries and could be used in
developing new anti-corruption measures.
The proceeds from petty corruption in developing countries are often of
domestic origin and are generally spent domestically, so they continue to circulate
among the population that exacts and pays the bribes. They continue, therefore,
to contribute to the originating country’s economy. The proceeds of grand
corruption, on the other hand, are often obtained directly or indirectly from
international development aid—thus depriving the intended beneficiaries of
some, if not all, of the value of the aid. As in the cases examined here, the diverted
funds may then be invested in property, enterprises, or bank accounts outside the
developing country, thereby denying the country even indirect benefits from the
diverted funds. Moreover, those engaging in grand corruption are usually already
socio-economically privileged. Because the perpetrators are political and business
leaders, their corrupt acts are a betrayal of public trust and are often criminal.
The two Kenyan cases and the case from Afghanistan illustrate these points. They
demonstrate the complexity of the corruption schemes, their destabilizing effect
on the fiscal systems and economies of their countries, and the difficulty even for
donors to obtain redress.
A. KENYA

Situated in East Africa, Kenya had in 2013 a population of 44.3 million and a
GDP of 5.5 billion USD.41 In the 2013–2014 fiscal year, its revenues, including
development revenues, were approximately 9.7 billion USD and its actual
expenditures were 10.08 billion USD.42 During 2013, Kenya received ODA of

41. The World Bank, “World DataBank: World Development Indicators” (2015), online:
<databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=World-Development-Indicators> [World
Bank, “World DataBank”].
42. Edward RO Ouko, Summary of the Report of the Auditor General on the Financial Statements
of Ministries, Departments, Commissions, Funds and Other Accounts of the National Government
for the Year 2013/2014 (Nairobi: Office of the Auditor-General, 2015) at 5, online: <www.
kenao.go.ke/index.php/reports/doc_download/243-report-2013-2014>. The figures have
been converted from Kenyan shillings to USD using a conversion factor of 100:1.
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3.2 billion USD. 43 But with a Gross National Income (“GNI”) per capita of
1,160 USD, its status as a lower income country is moving to that of a lower
middle income country. The economic outlook is reasonably bright despite
a poverty rate of over 45 per cent44 and a 2013 unemployment rate variously
reported as 9.2 per cent45 and 40 per cent.46 The discrepancy in unemployment
rates is possibly owing to the fact that the formal work sector constitutes only
19 per cent of all employment47 and that there is a disproportionately high
youth unemployment rate.48 Over 45 per cent of the population lives below the
poverty line and received almost 2 billion USD in ODA in 2013.49 In the 2014
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, 144 of 175 countries
were considered less corrupt than Kenya.50 Even in relation to other sub-Saharan
countries, then, Kenya tends to have a high rate of corruption.
1.

GOLDENBERG INTERNATIONAL LTD.

Goldenberg International Ltd. (“Goldenberg”) was created in 1990 to export gold
and diamond jewellery from Kenya. The principals were a Kenyan entrepreneur
of Asian descent and the Director of the Kenyan National Security Intelligence
Service. The intelligence director was also a director of Firestone East Africa
(1969) Ltd. and First American Bank Ltd. At the time, Kenya was a one-party
state with a struggling economy. Interest rates were soaring as high as 80 per
cent, exports were declining, real GDP had dropped 5 per cent in one year,51 and
there was a hard currency crisis. Total external debt totalled 6.56 billion USD or
75 per cent of the GDP. Over 50 per cent of the debt was owed to multilateral
agencies and a further 35 per cent to bilateral donors—so Kenyan government
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

World Bank, “World DataBank,” supra note 41.
Ibid.
Ibid.
KPMG, “Monitoring African Sovereign Risk” (2013) 1 KPMG East Africa Limited 1.
Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis, Kenya Economic Report
2013 (Nairobi: KIPPRA, 2013) at 29-34, online: <www.kippra.org/downloads/
Kenya%20Economic%20Report%202013.pdf>.
Ibid.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Aid (ODA) Disbursements to
Countries and Regions [DAC2a] (Paris: OECD, 2015) [OECD, ODA Disbursements].
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 (Berlin:
Transparency International, 2014), online: <issuu.com/transparencyinternational/
docs/2014_cpibrochure_en/3?e=2496456/10375453>.
International Monetary Fund, Kenya: Ex Post Assessment of Longer-Term Program Engagement
(Washington: IMF, October 2008), online: <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/
cr08338.pdf> [IMF, Kenya: Ex Post Assessment].
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spending was heavily dependent on international assistance. At the same time,
the government had committed to multi-party elections in 1992 and therefore
needed to generate substantial funds to campaign for its re-election.52
Two pieces of legislation were used to help ameliorate the economic situation.
One was the Exchange Control Act, which designated the Central Bank of Kenya
(“CBK”) as the sole dealer in hard currency and required foreign currency dealers
to sell their foreign currency to the CBK in return for Kenyan shillings.53 The
other was the Export Compensation Act, which provided for exporters to receive
cash incentives of 20 per cent of the value of exported non-traditional goods that
earned hard currency.54
Goldenberg claimed in its letter of application to export gold that it would
earn the Kenyan Treasury 50 million USD annually for five years. Consequently,
it was set up as a virtual monopoly with the help of principals in the Kenyan
government, and all precious metal dealers were required to sell or export their
goods directly through Goldenberg. Moreover, the Minister of Finance agreed
to pay Goldenberg an export incentive of 35 per cent. This constituted a
premium of 15 per cent over the legislated amount, thereby overriding the Export
Compensation Act and violating other regulatory statutes such as the Monopolies
and Price Control Act.55
By early 1991, through the company bank account at First American
Bank, Goldenberg had presented nine claim forms to Customs, duly certified
by the Minerals and Geology Branch, for payment of the 35 per cent incentive
on purported sales to two false foreign companies (Servino Securities Inc. and
Solitaire of Switzerland) and to an acquired company (World Duty Free). First
American Bank received, however, rather than inter-bank transfers, direct
deposits in USD, British pounds, Swiss francs, French francs, Italian lira, and
Japanese yen. This raised the bank’s suspicions that Goldenberg was illegally
dealing in hard currency. When the bank protested, the CBK issued a foreign
exchange dealer’s licence to Goldenberg and paid the incentive claims. The
incentive claims expanded in 1992. In addition, Goldenberg acquired 6 million
USD short-term bridge financing (later extended) from the government under
an existing revolving fund to help exporters manufacture or prepare goods that
52.
53.
54.
55.

Hornsby, supra note 7.
Exchange Control Act (Kenya), 1953, c 113, part 2, s 3.
Local Manufactures (Export Compensation) Act (Kenya), 1974, c 482, ss 3, 7.
Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies, and Price Control Act (Kenya), 1989, c 504; Peter
Warutere, The Goldenberg Conspiracy: The Game of Paper, Gold, Money and Power (Pretoria,
South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2005); Gladwell Oteino, All That Glitters? An
Appraisal of the Goldenberg Report (Nairobi: Africa Centre for Open Governance, 2011).
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would earn foreign income. As time passed, the government also issued a licence
to allow Goldenberg to set up its own bank—the Exchange Bank. The CBK also
issued foreign exchange bearer certificates with the stated aim of giving importers
access to foreign currency to finance their operations. Through the Exchange
Bank, Goldenberg managed to gain effective control of the foreign exchange
bearer certificates and manipulate them in its favour.56
Before mounting pressure from the banking community led to the closure of
Goldenberg and the Exchange Bank, Goldenberg obtained another 900 million
USD from the CBK, most of it through three large fraudulent transactions. In
the first, the Exchange Bank and six other dubious banks obtained advances of
530 million USD in four days through a cheque-kiting scheme. In the second,
Goldenberg obtained 210 million USD in advance payments from CBK when
Exchange Bank sent documentation showing that Goldenberg had made deposits
from its sale of gold and diamond jewellery into CBK accounts in London and
New York. No deposits, in fact, had been made. In the third transaction, 100
million USD was transferred in three payments to a Goldenberg bank account
on the instructions of the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury.57
With the collapse of the company and its bank, it was discovered that no gold
or diamonds had ever been exported, that two of the three foreign companies
were dummy enterprises, and that it was likely that the foreign currency for the
deposits had been bought on the black market in Mombasa. Goldenberg was
in fact a money laundering and cheque-kiting operation, very likely designed
to divert funds from the Kenyan Treasury to finance the upcoming elections.
By 1993, the company had submitted 160 forms claiming 375 million USD
for the export of non-existent gold and diamonds.58 It had also acquired 900
million USD from the three fraudulent transactions and other proceeds from
cheque-kiting, dealing in foreign bearer bonds, and other incidental transactions.
All of the proceeds came from the Kenyan Treasury. While one half to two-thirds
of the funds were recovered, it is estimated that between 600 million USD and
1.25 billion USD—representing more than 10 per cent of GDP—was lost to
the Kenyan Treasury.59 The scheme destabilized the Kenyan economy and caused
a steep rise in inflation; there were periods between 1990 and 1993 when the
Treasury was virtually emptied of all funds.60
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Warutere, supra note 55; Otieno, supra note 55; Hornsby, supra note 7 at 505-509.
Otieno, supra note 55.
Waurtere, supra note 55 at 10.
Ibid.
Hornsby, supra note 7 at 505-509.
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There had been suspicion of Goldenberg from the beginning. The media
began asking questions in 1992, but the government actively defended the
operations of the company. A CBK clerk had queried the Goldenberg incentive
payments. When ignored, the clerk passed the papers to the opposition, who
subsequently dismissed the allegation.61 It was not until 1993, when the Kenya
Economic Survey appeared, that the irregularities became obvious. Although
the government maintained that Goldenberg had earned 145 million USD for
Kenya by the end of 1992, the survey showed there had been no appreciable
export of commodities and that the total value of all mineral exports had been
only 40 million USD.62
The officials implicated in the scheme were the Vice President (who was
also the Minister of Finance); the heads of Treasury, the CBK, and Customs;
and the Permanent Secretary in the President’s Office. The Minister of Finance
resigned before the scandal broke but remained as Vice President. The President’s
two sons were implicated, while the President himself was also suspected of
involvement. A commission of inquiry set up in 2003 by a new President,
Mwai Kibaki, singled out the former President and two of his associates for
further investigation by the Attorney General,63 but there is no record of the
investigation having taken place. For example, the records of the World Bank
Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative cite statements from an 8 May 2002 hearing of
the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit. These statements asserted that the Goldenberg affair had paid
to the Kenyan President and his “cronies” an estimated minimum of 5 billion
USD and that he and his associates had secreted illicit fund sums equivalent to
the size of the Kenyan national debt of that time.64 No other source suggests the
same magnitude of sums involved in Goldenberg as those mentioned in the US
House of Representatives Subcommittee statements, but most imply or hint at
the implication of the President and his sons.
When the scheme became public in 1993, the head of the CBK resigned. In
1994, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury followed suit, but no one was ever
prosecuted. An audit ordered by a new Minister of Finance found that Goldenberg,
the Exchange Bank, and the CBK had been involved in embezzlement and money
laundering, but no action was taken on the conclusions. Even the institution of
61.
62.
63.
64.

Otieno, supra note 55.
Warutere, supra note 55.
Oteino, supra note 55.
Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, “Daniel Arap Moi- Goldenberg Scandal” (2015), online:
<star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18610>.
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the Commission of Inquiry did not result in any prosecutions—even though
the principal facilitator of the Goldenberg affair, Kamlesh Pattni, testified to the
Commission that he was close to the leaders of the President’s party, and that
he had agreed with the former President that he would fund the party electoral
machine. Pattni also avoided prosecution and had all charges against him and
his associated companies quashed by the Kenya High Court in March 2013, on
the grounds that his constitutional rights had been violated because the case had
dragged on for too long.65
The judicial decision in favour of Pattni proved controversial. In 2015 the
judge who cleared him faced a judicial tribunal investigating the way he handled
the case,66 and the Court of Appeal allowed the Director of Public Prosecutions
to challenge the acquittal. Pattni thus still remains vulnerable to sanctions,
although after twenty-five years of eluding prosecution and consolidating
his wealth67—not to mention becoming a pastor and running for Parliament
in the 2013 elections—he seems invulnerable to all vicissitudes.68 One of his
incarnations, albeit fictional, may lead to immortality: Parts of his story are used
imaginatively and sympathetically for the protagonist and plot of the Scotiabank
Giller Prize-winning novel, The In-Between World of Vikram Lall, by the
Kenyan-Canadian novelist, M.G. Vassanji.69 But in the end, even the novel stops
short of deciding the ultimate fate of the flawed character. It is not certain that he
perished in the fiery destruction of the building in which he was staying. Pattni’s
political partners, too, seem to have avoided sanction, perhaps because Anglo
Leasing, another significant political corruption scandal, emerged to overshadow
the Goldenberg affair.
2.

ANGLO LEASING AND FINANCE CO. LTD.

The Anglo Leasing affair took its name from one of a number of existent and
non-existent companies with which the Kenyan government had supply contracts.
65. Galgalo Fayo, “Judge defiant after clearing Pattni of Goldenberg scam,” Business Daily Africa
(21 April 2013), online: <www.businessdailyafrica.com/Judge-defiant-after-clearing-Pattniof-Goldenberg-scam/-/539546/1754552/-/mdsp8hz/-/index.html>.
66. “Pattni case judge to face tribunal,” Daily Nation (8 May 2015), online: <www.nation.co.ke/
news/Pattni-case-judge-to-face-tribunal/-/1056/2710798/-/ve8b15z/-/index.html>.
67. “Kamlesh Pattni puts his cash into real estate,” Daily Nation (20 February 2014),
online: <www.nation.co.ke/news/Kamlesh-Pattni-Real-Estate-Wealth/-/1056/2215646/-/
sxgvruz/-/index.html>.
68. Michela Wrong, “Running on Amnesia,” The New York Times (22 February 2013), online:
<latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/22/kenya-election-campaign-run-on-amnesia/?_r=0>.
69. (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2004).
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The affair began under the same President who was in office during the Goldenberg
Affair. In 2002, the new President was elected on the promise to eliminate
government corruption. He created the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
(“KACC”), appointed a former director of Transparency International Kenya as
Permanent Secretary for Ethics and Anti-Corruption, and appointed a judicial
commission of inquiry to examine the Goldenberg Affair.70 After a year in office,
however, the new government, too, showed signs of engaging in corruption as a
source of funding for the next election.71
Most of the contracts were for the purchase of security equipment and
services. The choice of commodities and services was a suitable cover for corrupt
dealings; in a post-September 11 world, the need for the contracts would likely
go unquestioned and allow secrecy to be maintained. A number of the contracts
were genuine, but the costs were inflated.72 Other companies such as Anglo
Leasing were dummy corporations created for the purposes of processing funds
diverted from government and depositing them in banks in the United Kingdom,
France, and Switzerland. The facilitators of the scheme and the owners of Anglo
Leasing were two Kenyan entrepreneurs of Asian descent. The government
leaders involved in the corruption included the Minister of Finance, Minister
of Security, Vice-President, Minister of Justice, the Permanent Secretary of the
Public Service, and the Permanent Secretary for Security.73
The case came to light in 2004 when the Permanent Secretary for Ethics and
Anti-Corruption, John Githongo, obtained intelligence that Anglo Leasing was a
non-existent company that had been paid a commitment fee of 3 per cent of the
value of a 30.14 million USD contract by the Kenyan government for the supply
of tamper-proof passports. He discovered that there were nineteen contracts of
the same nature totalling between 750 million USD and 1 billion USD. Some
had been created for corrupt purposes by the previous government and had been
continued by the new government.
Githongo took his concerns to various ministers and reported his findings on
many occasions to the President. While the response of the President was vague,
the ministers were all too honest in telling him that he was being obstructionist
and was preventing the government from acquiring the money it needed for the
70. The Honourable Justice SEO Bosire, Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the
Goldenberg Affair (Nairobi: Republic of Kenya, 2005).
71. John Githongo, Kenya: Githongo Report (Nairobi: Africafocus Bulletin, 2006) [Githongo
Report]; Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat, supra note 6 at 62.
72. IMF, Kenya: Ex Post Assessment, supra note 51.
73. Githongo Report, supra note 71; Kenya, National Assembly, Official Report (Hansard), (18
April 2006) 465 at 479.
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next election.74 They also put pressure on the KACC and the Attorney General
to close down investigations based on Githongo’s information. Nevertheless,
Anglo Leasing repaid some of the money and the government cancelled some
of the promissory notes it had signed. Githongo, however, continued to gather
information and started secretly recording his conversations with the ministers.75
By 2005, he believed his life was in danger, and he fled to the United Kingdom,
where he wrote a full report to the President (a nineteen-page summary that was
posted online).
Again, the multilateral institutions froze aid payments in an effort to have
Kenya deal with the massive diversion of public funds. The KACC undertook an
investigation, and in 2005, three former permanent secretaries and three other
senior public officials were charged.76 However, apart from one conviction of the
former Permanent Secretary of Home Affairs, who was fined 35,000 USD, the
cases against the defendants collapsed.
The Anglo Leasing affair continues to be problematic for the Kenyan
government. While seven of the contracts were stopped, three were fulfilled.
Three others were partially fulfilled but were never fully paid by the government.
In addition, the previous government had signed promissory notes that were
legally binding. It had also entered into agreements with financial institutions
to borrow money to pay the contracts, which the financial institutions had
started paying. In 2014, a UK judgement found the Kenyan government liable
for the payment of two of the contracts. Given that the two contracts had very
favourable rates of interest that had continued to accrue over the years, the award
was substantial. While public opinion in Kenya was that of general opposition to
paying, the government was about to launch an international bond offering and
did not want to jeopardize its success, so the President directed the Treasury to
pay the required amount—which was over 16 million USD.77
Later in 2014, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (“EACC”),
the successor to the KACC, provided five Anglo Leasing files to the Swiss
government for an investigation of suspected Anglo Leasing assets in Swiss banks.
The UK and Swiss authorities froze assets and promised to return funds in the
74. Githongo Report, supra note 71.
75. Ibid.
76. Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, News Release, “The Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission (KACC) and the Anglo-Leasing Case” (24 October 2005), online: <www.eacc.
go.ke/WHATSNEW.ASP?ID=12&day=10/24/2005>.
77. George Omondi, “Treasury paid Anglo Leasing on Uhuru spokesman’s order,” Business Daily
Africa (21 May 2014), online: <www.businessdailyafrica.com/Treasury-paid-Anglo-Leasingon-Uhuru-spokesman-s-order/-/539546/2322758/-/j2h044z/-/index.html>.
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Anglo Leasing and other cases.78 The evidence provided by the two countries also
assisted the EACC to lay charges in 2015 against thirteen suspects in the case.
Among those charged were a serving senator, a former finance minister, a former
internal affairs secretary, a former transport minister, and a former postmaster
general as well as the principal external facilitator, his brother, and his father.
For a brief period, it looked as if the prosecution would be straightforward—but
since the laying of charges, other political events have intervened to muddy the
waters. The President published a “List of Shame,” which contained a list of
175 ministers and public officials allegedly involved in corrupt practices.79 The
EACC was given two months to investigate the named people and refer evidence
for prosecution to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Shortly afterwards,
four of the commissioners—including the Chair—were themselves accused of
dubious practices and were pressured to resign. In the meantime, four of the five
ministers named on the List of Shame were acquitted, some of the accused Anglo
Leasing principals were given permission to travel, and the external facilitators
in the case applied to have their prosecution stopped on various technicalities.80
In retaliation, the Director of Public Prosecutions further charged them with
submitting false documents in support of their cases.81 The political furor has
brought into question the intentions of the President in declaring a campaign
against corruption and having the List of Shame compiled.82 As a result, the Anglo
Leasing case has again lost profile and sunk into even more legal confusion. So
after more than thirteen years, and despite strong evidence and open discussion
of the politics in the case, a successful resolution remains out of sight.
78. Zeddy Sambu, “Experts fault Uhuru’s order to pay Anglo Leasing firms,” Daily Nation (17
May 2014), online: <mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Experts-fault-Uhuru-order-to-pay-AngloLeasing-firms/-/1950946/2318676/-/format/xhtml/-/138amg2z/-/index.html>.
79. “List of Shame: Corruption laid bare,” Daily Nation (31 March 2015), online: <www.nation.
co.ke/news/politics/List-of-Shame-EACC-Report-Parliament/-/1064/2672264/-/vvodg7z/-/
index.html>; Bernard Namunane, “Rich and powerful dominate anti-graft list,” Daily Nation
(4 March 2015), online: <mobile.nation.co.ke/news/Anglo-Leasing-Scandal-EACC-ListCourt-Case-Prosecution/-/1950946/2642944/-/format/xhtml/-/7s1gi3z/-/index.html>.
80. Fred Makana, “Court allows businessmen charged with Anglo Leasing scam to travel out of
country,” Standard Digital (25 April 2015), online: <www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2
000159644&story_title=Kenya-court-allows-businessmen-charged-with-anglo-leasing-scamto-travel-out-of-country>.
81. Peter Leftie, “Tobiko lets Kazungu Kambi off the hook,” Daily Nation (28 May
2015), online: <www.nation.co.ke/news/Kambi-let-off-the-hook/-/1056/2732636/-/
emtd0e/-/index.html>.
82. “Suspended EACC boss back in office,” Daily Nation (29 April 2015), online: <mobile.
nation.co.ke/news/Suspended-EACC-boss-back-in-office/-/1950946/2701582/-/format/
xhtml/-/2kdw1hz/-/index.html>.
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B. AFGHANISTAN

While corruption in Afghanistan has become notorious during the last fourteen
years of massive international military and development support, it tends to
lack the sophistication found in Kenya. At the end of 2001, Afghanistan had no
national government or state institutions, no political parties, and no banks or
financial institutions. In the intervening years, government, public, and business
institutions were brought into existence and the rudiments of a regulatory regime
implemented. Even so, ethnic and tribal relationships still remain more important
than shared political beliefs. Elections are financed largely by the international
community, and Afghanistan remains a very poor and largely cash and subsistence
economy. It is in effect an “aid rentier” state in that it requires external financial
assistance to resource nearly all its government activities, including security,
operating, and development costs. Almost all (97 per cent) of its GDP is derived
from international military and aid spending. The government generates annual
revenues of only 2.5 billion USD, while its security costs total 6–8 billion USD
annually (over time to be reduced to 4.1 billon USD).83
In 2013, the estimated population of Afghanistan was almost thirty-one
million and its GNI over 20 billion USD.84 In 2010, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights reported that one-third of Afghans live in
absolute poverty and another 37 per cent of poor people hover on the edge.85
Government revenues in 2012 were 2.3 billion USD, which is roughly half the
annual 4.1 billion USD that international donors have pledged to support the
Afghan national security forces for the “Decade of Transition.”86 In 2013, with
5.3 billion USD in aid, Afghanistan was the top global recipient of ODA.87
This did not take into account military spending or the considerable bilateral
83. Sarajuddin Isar, “A Blessing or a Curse? Aid Rentierism and State-building in Afghanistan,”
E-International Relations (23 May 2014), online: <www.e-ir.info/2014/05/23/a-blessing-ora-curse-aid-rentierism-and-state-building-in-afghanistan>; Barnett R Rubin, “Political Elites
in Afghanistan: Rentier State Building, Rentier State Wrecking” (1992) 24:1 Intl J Middle E
Stud 77; SIGAR, Quarterly Report 1, supra note 25 at 11.
84. World Bank, World Development Indicators 2015 (Washington: World Bank, 2015), online:
<data.worldbank.org/news/release-of-world-development-indicators-2015>.
85. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Dimension of Poverty
in Afghanistan, (Kabul: UNHCHR, 2010) at 4; United Nations General Assembly, Human
Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the
Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan and on the Achievements of Technical Assistance in the
Field of Human Rights, UNHRCOR, 13th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/13/62 (2010).
86. Defence and Security Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Parliamentary
Assembly, Afghanistan: 2014 and Beyond (Brussels: NATO, October 2013) at 3, 8, 10, 12.
87. OECD, ODA Disbursements, supra note 49.
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donations that have poured into the country since the fall of the Taliban in
2001. Given that most of the donor funding has remained under international
control, however, there is little wealth in the Afghan Treasury. The opportunities
for plundering government finances are therefore low, but the massive influx of
not always well-managed international funding has nevertheless increased the
incidence of corruption.
1.

KABUL BANK

Two Afghan entrepreneurs established Kabul Bank in 2004. It was one of the
first Afghan banks to be formed and became one of the most successful, with one
million depositors and over 1 billion USD in funds. It handled about one-third of
all Afghan banking, including the government’s electronic payroll, and attracted
many small depositors through such promotion schemes as lottery draws.88
Concerns arose in 2008 that Kabul Bank lacked strong management. Much
of its capital was invested in the Dubai real estate market, and when that market
fell by 50 per cent in 2008, Kabul Bank lost many millions of dollars.89 But
corruption was not discovered until 2010, when, as the result of a falling out
between the principals, the bank founder reported the allegedly illegal activities
of the CEO. It transpired that the bank had paid 920 million USD in unsecured,
interest-free loans to nineteen people and companies—including one of the
President’s brothers and one of the First Vice President’s brothers. None of the
loans had a repayment schedule nor had the borrowers begun any repayment of
the loans. Most of those with the loans were either members of the government
or well connected to government. The loans had been used by the borrowers
for a number of purposes: to buy shares in the bank itself, to create a slush fund
used to buy the support of the major ethnic factions for presidential policies,
to finance the 2009 presidential election campaign, to start businesses, to buy
real estate, and to purchase a rickety airline that went bankrupt when one of its
airplanes crashed and killed all on board.90
88. Jon Boone, “The financial scandal that broke Afghanistan’s Kabul Bank,” The
Guardian (16 June 2011), online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/16/
kabul-bank-afghanistan-financial-scandal>.
89. Ibid.
90. Michael Huffman, “The Kabul Bank Scandal and the Crisis that Followed,” (3 December
2011), US Policy in a Big World (blog), online: <www.uspolicyinabigworld.com/wordpress/
wp-content/uploads/The_Kabul_Bank_Scandal_Version_2_FOOTNOTES.pdf>;
Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, Report of the
Public Inquiry into the Kabul Bank Crisis (Kabul: MEC, 15 November 2012), online: <mec.
af/files/knpir-final.pdf> [MEC, Kabul Bank Crisis Report].
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The bank remained solvent by constantly attracting new deposits and by
putting the government payroll deposit into overnight interest bearing accounts,
mainly with the Central Bank. The payroll deposits included police salaries,
which were entirely paid by international donors via reimbursement of the
Afghan government through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
(“LOTFA)”, managed by the UNDP.91 In other words, the bank was lending
the government its own money to earn interest, and the money coming in was
used to pay the demands on the bank. The bank maintained two sets of books: a
dummy set in Kabul and a valid set in Dubai. It was widely reported in the media
that the forensic audit following the discovery of this corruption had described
the bank as a giant Ponzi scheme.92
The affair was crude, and apart from the manipulation of the government
payroll, it did not involve public funds. That changed, however, when there was a
run on the bank after the corruption became generally known. In an effort to prop
up the bank, the government gave assurances that Kabul Bank deposits would
be guaranteed. The Central Bank, as lender of last resort, then transferred funds
to Kabul Bank to pay out depositors. The funds were secured by a promissory
note and agreement with the Ministry of Finance against government reserves,
but as an aid rentier state, nearly all Afghan government funds are derived from
international donations.93 The President was slow to take any measures to deal
with the bank until the IMF and other donors halted aid pending government
action to meet certain conditions—including a forensic audit, the recovery
of loan money, and a plan to repay the reserve fund.94 The Afghan Ministry

91. Personal knowledge of the author.
92. Matthew Rosenberg, “Audit Says Kabul Bank Began as ‘Ponzi Scheme,’” The New York Times
(26 November 2012), online: <www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/world/asia/kabul-bank-auditdetails-extent-of-fraud.html> [Rosenberg, “Ponzi Scheme”].
93. KPMG Afghanistan Limited, Da Afghanistan Bank: Audited Financial Statements For the
year ended 30 Hoot 1389 (Kabul: KPMG Afghanistan, 2011), online: <dab.gov.af/Content/
Media/Documents/FinStmt138920110320AfterAudit[1]662015112811597553325325.
pdf>; MEC, Kabul Bank Crisis Report, supra note 90 at 46-54; Matthew Rosenberg, “Afghans
Move to Bail Out Kabul Bank,” The Wall Street Journal (7 September 2010), online: <www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704095704575473650615414666>; Adam B Ellick
& Sangar Rahimi, “Afghanistan Pledges Support for Troubled Bank,” The New York Times
(6 September 2010), online; <www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/world/asia/07afghan.html>;
Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Parliament Approves Funds for
Central Bank” (16 October 2011), online: <mof.gov.af/en/news/4047>.
94. See e.g. Rosenberg, “Ponzi Scheme,” supra note 92. See MEC, Kabul Bank Crisis Report,
supra note 90 at 54.
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of Finance took over the part of the Bank that was still financially sound and
functioning and then renamed it the New Kabul Bank.
Despite the withholding of funds by the IMF and other donors, by 2014,
only 10 per cent of the money had been repaid. By this time, too, the two Kabul
Bank principals—together with twenty-one other defendants, mainly bank
employees and negligent regulators—who had been convicted were now free.
None of the politically well-connected borrowers had been prosecuted.95
A new president was elected in September 2014 on an anti-corruption
platform. The day after his election, he ordered the Attorney General to resume
the Kabul Bank investigation and produce results within six weeks. By November
2014, the jail sentences of the two former Kabul Bank principals had been tripled
to fifteen years each and the assets of those who had not repaid the loans were
frozen. Within nine months, however, the investigation had still not yielded
results. At the date of writing, a number of the prosecutions were caught between
the appellate courts and the Supreme Court, and asset recovery was encountering
obstacles due to “borrowers” leaving the country with substantial amounts of
the funds.96 Only 50 of 227 identified debtors have repaid their loans in full
and as of 16 February 2015, only 228 million USD of the 977 million USD in
dubious loans had been recovered.97 On a positive note, though, Afghanistan has
adopted an anti-money laundering law and a Pakistani bank has made an offer
to buy the New Kabul Bank. Even so, it is possible that the Kabul Bank affair
will be another large-scale developing country corruption case that will drag on
for years, result in large losses, and ensure virtual impunity for the perpetrators.98
95. Azam Ahmed & Declan Walsh, “New Afghan Leader, Putting Focus on Graft, Revives
Bank Fraud Inquiry,” The New York Times (1 October 2014), online: <www.nytimes.
com/2014/10/02/world/asia/afghanistan-president-corruption-investigation.html>.
96. Samirullah Popal, “The Kabul Bank Case: Corruption, Inquiry and Impunity” Integrity
Watch Afghanistan (2015), online: <www.iwaweb.org/tmaf/docs/advocacy_brief_kabul_
bank_case_2015.pdf>.
97. Ibid.
98. In November 2015, there were indications that the case would assuredly linger on.
Khalilullah Ferozi, the first principal in the Kabul Bank Affair, was prominent in a
stone-laying ceremony for a new, ultra-modern housing development in Kabul called
Smart City. Everyone thought he was in prison. He was introduced at the ceremony by the
President’s Advisor on Good Governance, and the Minister of Urban Development officiated
at the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Ferozi and the company
building Smart City. He owns the land that Smart City will be built on. His presence was
largely unremarked by local media but picked up by The New York Times and The Guardian.
The government was embarrassed, particularly as the question was raised as to whether the
President, with his anti-corruption stand, was aware of Ferozi’s involvement in the Smart
City scheme. As a consequence of the incident, the President’s legal advisor has resigned.
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III. COMMON FEATURES OF THE CORRUPTION CASES
The three cases described above exhibit a number of common features, which they
may share with other grand corruption cases in other developing countries. The
characteristics fall into four categories: (1) political weaknesses, (2) governance
weaknesses, (3) detrimental effects of status and class, and (4) weakness of
international controls.
A. POLITICAL WEAKNESSES

In all of the cases discussed, the amounts appropriated were enormous and
represented a significant percentage of government financial resources. For
example, the Afghan reserves devoted to propping up Kabul Bank were equivalent
to about 20 per cent of the annual revenues of 2 billion USD. Flagrancy and lack
of impunity were the hallmarks of corruption in developing countries during
the Cold War period, but it appears that the situation has not improved—
despite the greater attention now paid to the corrupt activities of developing
country governments.
The pressure to find a source of funding for financing election campaigns
seems to have been a motivation for all three cases of grand corruption. Election
campaigns anywhere cost many millions of dollars, and in the two countries
discussed, bribery and buying votes are part of the system and so add to the cost.
The two countries also appear to lack either provisions for regulating election
spending or established practices for political parties to raise funds for elections
in a transparent manner. With thin regulatory frameworks and little practice in
holding democratic elections, the act of diverting government funds to pay for
the next election of the party in power can become a norm—albeit an illegal one.
While the value of the land may repay some of the Kabul Bank money Ferozi still owes (he
says that he is on work-release and returns to prison after office hours), his presence at the
ceremony and the tribute paid to him indicate that his malfeasance is not taken seriously
by the Afghan business community and even the Afghan government. See Martine van
Bijlert, “The Afghan Government and the ‘Smart City’ Debacle: Who out-smarted whom?”
Afghan Analysts Network (21 November 2015), online: <www.afghanistan-analysts.org/
the-afghan-government-and-the-smart-city-debacle-who-out-smarted-whom>; Mujib
Mashal, “Afghan Businessman Convicted in Kabul Bank Fraud Is Still Free to Make Money,”
The New York Times (4 November 2015), online: <www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/world/
asia/afghan-businessman-convicted-in-kabul-bank-fraud-is-still-free-to-make-money.html?_
r=1>; Emma Graham-Harrison, “Afghan government signs huge property deal with shamed
ex-banker,” The Guardian (5 November 2015), online: <www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
nov/05/afghan-government-signs-huge-property-deal-shamed-ex-banker>.
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The three cases also occurred in societies where petty or bureaucratic
corruption is endemic. Though the relationship between petty and grand
corruption was not examined in this article, the existence of widespread
bureaucratic corruption may suggest that the public is habituated to the use
of public office for private benefit and is therefore less shocked or impelled to
act in cases of grand corruption. Both societies are also ethnically factionalized;
faction members are perhaps disinclined either to condemn the corruption
committed by members of their own ethnic groups or cooperate across ethnic
groups to condemn or work against corruption. As discussed in Part II, above,
in collective societies and relationship cultures where democratic traditions or
central government and bureaucracies are not well entrenched, people appear to
have lower expectations of such abstract notions as public trust. This may help
explain why even though the corruption became public knowledge through the
news media in all of the three cases, public opinion was not sufficiently aroused
to bring a halt to it. This is what ultimately allowed the perpetrators to continue
with impunity.
Another common feature of the cases is that new approaches are introduced
with the advent of a new political regime, and the new broom sweeps clean—
at least until the new regime becomes corrupt. This means, however, that
corruption has the possibility of thriving for the length of an electoral mandate
and that nations can become the victims of successive kleptocracies—each one
displacing the previous one, only to put another in its place. This seems to have
been the case in Kenya from independence until at least 2008. Kleptocracies
can strip governments of their assets and disable the delivery of public services
or simply appropriate large amounts of international aid so that development is
undermined. As long as elections take place regularly, however, there is always the
possibility of breaking the kleptocratic cycle by introducing new strategies with a
new government. That is what appears to be currently happening in Afghanistan,
although it is far from clear at this stage whether there will be success.99
99. And indeed, there are already indications that the anti-corruption resolve of the new Afghan
government is wavering. At the beginning of November 2015, Khalilullah Ferozi, the first
principal in the Kabul Bank Affair, was prominent in a stone-laying ceremony for a new,
ultra-modern housing development in Kabul, called Smart City. Everyone thought he was in
prison. He was introduced at the ceremony by the President’s Advisor on Good Governance,
and then the Minister of Urban Development officiated at the signing of a memorandum
of understanding between Ferozi and the company building Smart City. Ferozi owns the
land that Smart City will be built on. His presence was largely unremarked by local media
but picked up by the New York Times and the Guardian. The government was embarrassed,
particularly as the question was raised as to whether the President, with his anti-corruption
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B. GOVERNANCE WEAKNESSES

Despite official denial and impunity in the Kenyan cases, the need to report
information regularly to Parliament and to comply with certain governance
mechanisms helped in some small measure to uncover both corruption cases.
This was less true in Afghanistan. While the Kabul Bank corruption did not
originate in government, governance principles are as important in the private
as in the public sector—since without trust and confidence, an economy is
unlikely to flourish. In all three cases, it appeared that regulations were easily
ignored or manipulated, and the principals behaved as if they had personal
rather than delegated right and authority. There was a marked lack of attention
to accountability and transparency, either in the transactions or in the aftermath
and public discussion.
Despite the emphasis on good governance by multilateral agencies and
international donors, it does not seem to be part of the consciousness or even
the rhetoric of some developing country governments. This suggests that the
multilateral agencies are not getting the message across to recipient countries
that values such as accountability, transparency, efficiency, effectiveness,
responsiveness, forward vision, and rule of law constitute a formula for good
governance and are not just philosophical concepts.
Another weakness in governance that created the circumstances for
corruption to occur was the existence of weak or culpable central banks with
little independence from the political regime. While both countries have general
corruption oversight mechanisms, they lack strength and effectiveness. In
Kenya, judging from the recent events discussed in Part II(A)(1), above, even
the EACC corruption oversight body appears to be suffering from the malaise
it is mandated to cure. Neither country, moreover, appears to have independent
banking oversight mechanisms apart from the central banks. It is also evident
in all three cases that attorneys general were slow or reluctant to prosecute and
lacked expertise to investigate and prosecute the cases. Finally, where public
inquiries occurred, they uncovered valuable information but ultimately did not

stand, was aware of Ferozi’s involvement in the Smart City scheme. As a consequence of the
incident, the President’s legal advisor has resigned. While the value of the land may repay
some of the Kabul Bank money Ferozi still owes (he says that he is on work-release and
returns to prison after office hours), his presence at the ceremony and the tribute paid to him
indicate that his malfeasance is not taken seriously by either the Afghan business community
or the Afghan government. See Graham-Harrison, ibid.
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succeed in having the principals prosecuted. This was owed to the government’s
failure to act decisively on the information gathered by the inquiries.
C. DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF STATUS AND CLASS

In all three cases, there was an economic and social hierarchy of players. First
were the politicians and those who were politically well-connected. These were
the principal beneficiaries of the schemes in both countries. In the Kenyan cases,
those involved were the most politically powerful people in the country, occupying
positions that allowed them to facilitate the diversion of funds by the use of their
authority and connections as well as legal and bureaucratic mechanisms. In Kabul,
too, the principal beneficiaries were connected to the political and social elite. In
both countries, however, the politicians and the politically well-connected were
not able to manage the business side of the corruption, which was outside their
realm. For that they required business partners.
The business partners were the second group of players. They were the
“fixers,” facilitators, and entrepreneurs with experience in setting up companies,
investing, and moving money around. They became the principals of the corrupt
companies and banks. They were not part of the privileged governing or social
class, however. In Kenya, the entrepreneurs in the two cases came from the Asian
business community, which is regarded with some wariness by Kenyans and in
turn keeps itself somewhat aloof from African society.100 In Afghanistan, the two
Kabul Bank principals had worked in Russia. The founder was an international
poker player and was recently discovered to have an outstanding Russian arrest
warrant against him for illegal banking activities, organization of a criminal
group, and money laundering.101 The Kabul Bank CEO was a former gem dealer
who sold Afghan emeralds to print money for both the Northern Alliance and
the Taliban.102 Perhaps because of their outsider status, the entrepreneurs seemed
to have had more difficulty than the politicians in extricating themselves from
the corrupt businesses and avoiding prosecution. There is no evidence that they
have been protected or received support from the establishment with which they
rubbed shoulders for joint profit. The Kenyan entrepreneurs have so far used
wits and money to avoid penalty. But if these run out, as they seem to have
done for the two Kabul entrepreneurs, they are likely to suffer consequences

100. Vincent Cable, “The Asians of Kenya” (1969) 68:272 Afr Aff 218 at 226.
101. MEC, Kabul Bank Crisis Report, supra note 90 at 22.
102. Dexter Filkins, “The Afghan Bank Heist,” Letter, The New Yorker (14 February 2011), online:
<www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/02/14/the-afghan-bank-heist>.
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more severe than those faced by the political partners whose corrupt enrichment
they facilitated.
A third group of players evident in all of the cases are the minor officials, who
in some cases became the scapegoats. While some were honest whistleblowers,
others could have been among those engaging in petty corruption under different
circumstances. In the cases of grand corruption, they were blamed for some
aspects of the schemes, lost their jobs, or were convicted for minor offences. It is
unlikely any of them benefitted from their involvement in the cases. Certainly, the
Kenya Commercial Bank clerk who reported the irregularities of the Goldenberg
claims did not benefit. He lost his job, was jailed, and died in poverty from
tuberculosis.103 In the face of power, influence, and money, their attempts to stop
the corruption were futile. Instead, they became victims of the corrupt activity.
D. WEAKNESS OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS

A fourth group involved in the cases are the multilateral institutions and bilateral
donors. On the margins, they could only observe the fate of the donated funds
and were unable to do much more than freeze or withhold funding in an effort to
influence events. Whether this had much effect is debatable. In Afghanistan, for
example, despite the IMF and other donors freezing aid funding, the government
was able to continue to fund operations from the unspent development budget
it had accumulated. Because of the insurgency, the international community did
not cut off the funds it supplied to support and pay the Afghan national security
forces. Notably, the programs that tend to suffer when bilateral aid is cut off are
social programs—such as healthcare and education—that benefit poor people
the most. Cutting off international assistance stopped the flow of project funding
but not large transfers and loans.
More important is the role the multilateral institutions and bilateral donors
played in creating the conditions that led to the corruption in the first place. Large
influxes of financial aid that are not always well managed create the conditions
for corruption to occur. In Afghanistan in particular, there was so much funding
available that it was impossible to use or absorb it all. As a consequence, much
of it either went to waste or fuelled corruption.104 It is not surprising, then,
that in low income and subsistence economies, some seize the opportunity to

103. Oteino, supra note 55 at iii.
104. SIGAR, Quarterly Report 3, supra note 25; Jamie Tarabay, “Afghanistan and the bottom
line,” Al Jazeera America (2 April 2014), online: <america.aljazeera.com/features/2014/4/
afghanistan-and-thebottomline.html>.
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appropriate international funds when it is available. In fact, it is surprising that
corruption is not more prevalent in such circumstances.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
Grand corruption in developing countries often involves the direct or indirect
diversion of astounding amounts of international funding intended for
development in disadvantaged countries. The Secretary General of the United
Nations, Ban Ki-moon, has estimated that 30 per cent of all development
funding is lost to corruption.105 Losing nearly one-third of all development
funding undermines the foreign policy and development aims of the donor
governments, reduces opportunities for stability and improved living standards
in disadvantaged countries, and creates cynicism and reluctance to support
international development among taxpayers of the advanced countries. And as
the inconclusiveness of the three corruption cases demonstrates, donor countries
currently have little recourse either to prevent the loss of funds to corruption or
to recover misappropriated funds, even after decades of trying to do so. If the
problem is increasing, as some suggest,106 then current mechanisms for curbing
corruption are not working. New approaches are needed for both the prevention
and the successful investigation and prosecution of grand corruption when
it takes place.
Much is known about corruption in a general way, but there is much less
detailed knowledge of how corruption works in practice. Without knowledge
and understanding of the methods used by corrupt governments, politicians, and
facilitators to misappropriate and convert development funds to their own use,
countermeasures cannot be completely effective. Studying particular cases and
building up a cumulative picture of methods and patterns could contribute to
developing new approaches to enable multilateral agencies to combat corruption
on the ground. The three cases identified culture, lack of governance, the roles
of different actors, and the inconclusiveness of investigations and inquiries
as common features. These are perhaps just a few of the characteristics that
might emerge given a more detailed study of a wider selection of cases from
around the world.

105. Jenny Lei Ravelo, “30 percent of aid lost to corruption – Ban Ki-moon” (10
July 2012), The Development Newswire (blog), online: <www.devex.com/
news/30-percent-of-aid-lost-to-corruption-ban-ki-moon-78643>.
106. Kar & LeBlanc, supra note 22 at iii.
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From the cultural perspective, the three cases tentatively indicate that grand
corruption is more threatening than petty corruption to development goals. It
therefore makes strategic sense for international agencies to concentrate efforts
on reducing grand corruption. Petty corruption has socially corrosive elements
but it also has positive dimensions: it is based on cultural norms of reciprocity;
it benefits many rather than a few people; it is a survival mechanism in countries
where governments neglect the welfare of their citizens; and it generally keeps
the payments in the country, where they continue to recycle and create benefit.
Grand corruption, on the other hand, largely benefits a few already privileged
people and detracts from the common good. Much practical attention is devoted
to prevention of petty corruption, but little is given to the contextual factors that
support it. Efforts to curb grand corruption, however, seem more focused on
describing the events after they take place than preventing them in the first place.
Lack of governance mechanisms in developing countries also hinders the
prevention and detection of corruption. Regulatory and oversight frameworks
tend to be rudimentary. Expertise tends to be low among regulatory, oversight,
and law enforcement officials responsible for preventing the misuse of funds or
for recovering misappropriated assets. Additionally, there is no widespread use
of automated systems that reduce the opportunities for corruption and store
information that disappears easily from paper records. The close relationships
between those operating in the private and public sectors also escape close
scrutiny, so the line between public and business sectors is not always clear.
Politicians and public officials own and manage businesses while still in public
office and use business associates and facilitators to carry out what should be
public duties. This is particularly so in the procurement of goods and services,
including large national and international contracts. At the same time, officials in
the criminal justice system, including police, prosecutors, and judges, are not at
arm’s length from either the business sector or politics. Knowing more about how
these relationships operate is important for developing systems of transparency
and accountability.
The 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption (“UNCAC”) is
a strong enabling framework for developing focused mechanisms to combat
corruption and the loss of international development funds.107 Among other
things, it covers such matters as prevention, criminalization, and law enforcement
(including prosecution of those offering bribes to officials, mutual legal
assistance, and asset recovery). There are 176 parties to the UNCAC, including
107. 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41 (entered into force 14 December 2005) [UNCAC].
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Afghanistan and Kenya.108 As those two countries show, however, few developing
countries appear to have set up mechanisms required to give substance to their
UNCAC undertakings. The provisions of the UNCAC are comprehensive and
sophisticated and perhaps beyond the capacity of most developing countries to
implement on their own. Some international assistance has gone towards capacity
development of public administration and regulatory systems and the officials in
the systems. Nonetheless, establishing the legal and regulatory frameworks and
the administrative infrastructures they require for the UNCAC to be effective
requires sustained and concentrated funding and expert attention. Such support
does not seem to have been pursued with the same fervour as, say, international
security assistance. Important, long-term, and less visible solutions to chronic
problems can easily be neglected in international development because of urgent
matters such as response to humanitarian crises or insecurity. Consequently,
there is insufficient funding for and sustained attention to the practical analysis
of complicated corruption cases to help the design of countermeasures, the
development of mechanisms and methods to give effect to the UNCAC, or the
training and capacity development of those operating the mechanisms. Unless
this situation is remedied, corruption and the diversion of development funding
to the privileged few in developing countries will persist.

108. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “United Nations Convention against
Corruption: Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 December 2015” (2015), online:
<www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html>.

